DIEGO PARRILLA: My name is Diego Parrilla. I am a mining and petroleum engineer, originally
from Spain. I did my master’s in mineral economics in
France and in the US in the Colorado School of Mines. My first job was in sales and trading in investment
banking in the commodities and macro divisions. And I worked at JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs,
and Merrill Lynch across New York, London, and Singapore. Then I transitioned to the buy side, where
I started out with my own fund. And then I worked for a couple of very large
macro before I joined Quadriga Asset Managers in Madrid. It’s a $1.8 billion asset and wealth manager. And in addition to my experience in the buy
and sell side, I’m also a bestselling author. I have my first book, The Energy World is
Flat. It might be familiar to the Real Vision TV
crowd. Here today, we’re going to discuss in more
detail my second book, called The Anti-Bubbles and the Implications for the Markets. What are bubbles? What are anti-bubbles? I like to borrow George Soros’s definition
of a bubble. He talks about bubbles as asset valuations
that are artificially high based on beliefs that happen to be misconceptions. So beyond other metrics, he definitely looks
into the actual beliefs and misconceptions behind these bubbles. What I’ve done is I’ve generalized the framework,
and basically looking that misconceptions distort reality. But they not only distort reality by artificially
creating higher prices. They can also create artificially low prices. So in that sense, the concept of anti-bubble
has two dimensions. First is assets that are grossly artificially
cheap. In that sense, it’s the ultimate value investment. It’s a matter of when, not if that these values
will go up. But there’s a second dimension that is very
important, which is the fact that bubbles and anti-bubbles are some kind of distorted
mirror images of each other. So in that sense, by construction, the minute
the misconception is understood, the belief is understood to be false. And the bubble bursts exactly the same moment
where the anti-bubble deflates. So in that sense the, anti-bubble– I coined
it anti-bubble instead of inverted bubble or some other possibility to reflect this
idea that it’s a defense mechanism against the bubbles. It’s like an anti-virus or an antimissile. So anti-bubbles, effectively, both as value
investments and hedges or a defense mechanism against bubbles, are, I think, a powerful
concept that is worth keeping in mind, especially with what’s happening today. So basically, the key question becomes, in
this framework of bubbles and anti-bubbles, what are the current beliefs that are de facto
misconceptions? I’d like to start with the first one, which
is what I call the central bank put. The central bank put is the belief– in my
view, misconception– that central banks and governments are infallible, in full control,
and they can actually print and borrow their way out of any problems. This comes with one key sub-belief, let’s
say, which is the idea that monetary policy has no limits. This is a very deeply entrenched belief in
the market. It takes many forms, whether it’s never fight
the Fed or Draghi’s whatever it takes. Effectively, there’s a perception that we
can solve problems just by printing money. And this is something that– it doesn’t quite
work that way. So basically, one way to think about this
is Chinese equities. If you think about some of the investors in
Chinese equities or this idea of buy the dip, there’s a perception that Mommy and Daddy,
as I call them– the central banks and the governments– are always going to be there
providing that support to the market. So if you prompt someone that is long Chinese
equities, they might say, well, I sleep very well at night because if there’s ever a problem,
Mommy, the central bank, is going to come print some money to provide some support. If things go worse, then Mommy will print
more money to give to Daddy, the government, who will basically lend it through the system
and provide further support. And ultimately, if things go even worse, Mommy
can print money and buy the actual ETF or the assets, which is something that both China
and Japan have been doing. So in that sense, the problem and the big
issue with monetary policy, with the central bank put, is this idea that there’s no risk. And I would summarize this in one word, which
is complacency– so effectively, the idea of buying the dip and thinking that if I ever
get into trouble, Mommy and Daddy are going to come to the rescue. So the second dimension of the central bank
put is fiscal, is credit. Effectively, what we’ve seen is how– it’s
not just about money, the central bank printing money. It’s effectively a process where left pocket
lends the right pocket. We’re printing money to effectively lend it
to the governments. And this is a process that leads into things
like negative interest rates. This is the way my book starts, really trying
to change the rules of finance and asset valuation with negative interest rates, which I think
we’ll look back in history as one of the most dangerous experiments, which effectively transforms
the way in which assets are valued. Bonds that were thought to be capped effectively
can trade to infinity, and we have several other consequences. So in that sense, the idea that you can borrow
as much as you want is very much supported by the idea that you can print as much as
you want and lend in this process. So these two dynamics go very much hand in
hand. They’re obviously challenged by the question
of independence of the central banks, which is questionable these days– and not just
in the US, really across the board how this process works and whether central banks would
be able to– or governments would be able to borrow without that artificial bid from
the central bank. So these two pieces are very powerful, they’re
very deeply entrenched, and they lead to complacency. Complacency– if someone told us 10 years
ago, we were going to have x trillion dollars of bonds with negative yields, we would have
probably laughed or cried or both. Yet today, you look, for example, at the Swiss
government bond market, and the whole 50-year yield curve is in negative yields. And nobody blinks. So complacency around things and how they
change is certainly one of the pillars behind the issues that we face today. So the key second belief that, in my view,
is a misconception is this idea– and it’s more of a process whereby I define it as the
complacent desperate search for yield. And perhaps a good way to summarize this is
my mom when she goes in Spain to the bank. And the bank will tell her, Miss, minus 0.4. Effectively, she would tell them, listen,
you don’t quite understand. I need 5%. Or in other countries, it might be 8% or whatever
it is. But the reality is that investors, thanks
to this perception of low risk, have been building the house through the roof. We don’t go and say, listen, I want to take
x amount of risk. How much do you pay me for that? We say, no, I want to earn my 5%. What do I need to do? And we will do literally whatever it takes
as investors to get that. So I guess these two pillars– the whatever
it takes from the central banks and governments and the whatever it takes from the investors–
go hand in hand and have led to a series of parallel synchronized bubbles and anti-bubbles
as a result. Is this Time Different? : I guess a very– this time is different
is a question that comes up on a regular basis. And I think there is certainly a perception
within these beliefs that this time is different. Personally, I’m looking at this situation
a bit like watching West Side Story when you’ve already seen Romeo and Juliet. They’re obviously two different movies happening
in two different cities, different times, different scenarios, but the plot is virtually
identical. And I think if you look at Lehman 1.0, as
I call it, and Lehman squared, which is what I think is on the way, there are very clear
similarities. So if we were to tell this as a movie or as
a story, it’s not just a sequel. It’s a sequel squared. We haven’t really solved problems. We’ve transformed them. And just to give a very quick overview– this
is a bit like the Avengers movies. We love technology. We love miracles. So Lehman 1.0 was, in a way, the idea, the
belief that you could literally use securitization to take a piece of garbage and come up with
some gold with the alchemy of finance. So it all started with the miracle technology. In that case, it was securitization. Then you had a series of characters where
there is the greedy borrower, the greedy arranger, the sleepy policeman, where you basically
have a situation where eventually– and this is a key character in the movie is what I
call the acronyms. The acronyms hide– they come up very often. And when my mom asked me, what’s an acronym,
I say, well, in Lehman 1.0, there were the CBOs, CLOs, CDO squareds. What are they? And the reality is they are vehicles that
effectively lend a lot of money to the wrong people at the wrong size at the wrong price
at the wrong time. And this is what the acronyms were hiding. I must make clear this technology in itself
is not the problem. It’s the abuse of that technology. Just like nuclear technology is not the problem
in itself. It’s the use that we might make of that. And as a result of the abuse of the acronyms
in Lehman 1.0 and the other characters, we end up effectively with a process which is
gross misallocation of capital, a big bubble, and a problem. Now, if we fast forward to where we are today,
what is that new miracle technology? Well, that new miracle technology is monetary
policy. You can literally print your way out of any
problem. The new acronyms are QE, QQE, LTRO, YCC. They’re effectively ways in which we’re lending
too much money to the wrong people at the wrong price, the wrong time, in the wrong
volumes. And we are making exactly the same mistakes. They’re happening in different ways. We might be lending to governments through
government bonds and others, and these are second and thirdorder effects. The problem this time around is that that
gross misallocation of capital is of a much greater scale. I guess one of the key players in this movie
is the partner in crime, like in any movie. And I think that role in the Lehman 1.0 crisis
was played by the rating agencies, who basically told you, don’t worry, this is a triple-A
paper. Buy it. There’s no risk. We knew what happened. The models were wrong, et cetera. That role of the partner in crime today is
being played by the central banks. They are the ones who are not just telling
you this is fine. They’re actually financially bullying us into
taking more risk. And the problem with this is that it’s a bit
“Quis custodiet ipsos custodes”, who polices the police? The body whose primary objective should be
financial stability, in my view, is creating the biggest bubble in financial history. And this is the equivalent of a Hollywood
movie where the bad guy is the policeman. So in that sense, I think we are repeating
the same mistakes from Lehman 1.0. There’s obviously different characters, different
technologies, but it’s very much the great parallelisms which are leading us to where
we are today. So basically, once we’ve identified the beliefs–
the central bank put and the complacent, desperate search for yield, which go hand in hand, what
we’ve done is we’ve created a series of parallel synchronous bubbles which effectively come
from this desperate search for yield, which starts first and foremost with government
bonds. This is effectively a bubble in duration without
precedence. And what it means is we have been incentivized–
or rather, forced– by zero or negative interest rates to lend for longer and longer horizons
at lower and lower yields. So we were perfectly happy lending or buying
government bonds for one year. Now, effectively, we’ve been pushed to lend
5, 10, 15, 20 years. And this leads us to problem or candidate
bubbles number two, which is when my cash or bonds are yielding zero or negative, and
I need to go very far out, effectively, I’m incentivized to take more credit risk. I start with the better ratings, like investment
grade, but then I progressively go down into the chain looking for that carry, for that
yield. And I go into mez, and I go into high yield,
and of course I go into emerging markets. So effectively, this second piece of the bubble
is I’m lending to weaker and weaker credits for longer and longer for lower and lower
yields, this all based on the beliefs that we discussed. The third bubble, in my view comes, from in
public equities. So effectively, there’s a put called parity
relationship between bonds and equities. We are discounting at artificially low rates
and with highly complacent expectations. So effectively, that leads to, I think, trouble
on the equity space. The fourth pillar, the fourth bubble, is liquidity. So you would hear, oh, public equities are
too rich. Let’s go into the private space. So let’s go into private credit, private equity,
so effectively willing to invest into less liquid assets to capture that liquidity premium,
that extra yield that we need. If you move further down, we go, obviously,
into leverage, so the perception that rates are going stay low. There’s going to be low inflation. Money is cheap, et cetera. It leads us to borrow and leverage the bets. So going back to my mom, a few years ago,
she was able to buy one year triple-A and levered bonds to earn her 5%. Today, she might be into triple-B five to
10-year, three to four times levered. At least in Europe– obviously the situation
in the US is going through a process of normalization– but certainly, a large part of the world,
and in Europe in particular, we have this dynamic where something is dramatically changed. We were happy or able to earn that 5% with
risk we were comfortable. Now we’ve been effectively extending those
limits in all these dimensions to achieve these returns that we have grown accustomed
and that we demand. So as I said earlier, we’re building the house
through the roof based on these two pillars. But unfortunately, some people might think
that they’re diversified, because I have some equities and some bonds and some public equity,
whatever. The reality– it’s all one big macro trade. And if you remove the pillars, if those beliefs
are understood as misconceptions, I think you will see how all those come, and they
are actually one big trade. So it’s interesting to see which one of these
bubbles will either trigger things or which ones are the most dangerous. My view is that the epicenter of the bubbles
is obviously government bonds. That’s where the problem starts with this
extension and duration, these low base rates, artificially low interest rates and stuff. Now, the fact that it is the epicenter of
the problem doesn’t mean it’s the problem itself. Japan has taught us for decades that you can
actually have insane, I would say, monetary policy measures and move into regimes that
could last for a long time. So it’s a widow maker. The JGB market is a widow maker. And the minute– if you were short JGBs, zero
coupon JGBs at 99.99, what was your risk reward? Well, my risk reward was potentially $0.01
to make $100 or 100 yen. The minute you go into negative interest rates,
it’s game over. So we’ve really moved into a new world. And by left pocket lending the right pocket,
this could go pretty much anywhere. The problem becomes the other pockets. And I think what we’ve seen so far in the
time of this interview being shot– we’ve already seen significant trouble in the weaker
emerging markets, those that have significant imbalances at the macro level or significant
debt in non-local currency. So we’ve seen Argentina or Turkey or others
suffering. We’re following a process that is a bit–
combines two things. There’s a domino effect. So the weaker guys go first, and they push
farther out. But it’s also a snowball effect, so the pieces
are getting bigger and bigger. Think about the European crisis or the Lehman
crisis with the smaller banks and eventually getting to a too big to fail moment, or in
Europe with Iceland and Ireland and Portugal eventually getting us to that too big to fail
Spain or Italy moment. I think this crisis is the same. You start with the weaker guys falling first
and dragging along the rest. And I think the big issued I would say if
there are two main areas that worry me, one is high yield. This is no precedence of this size and scale
and levels. So that is a ticking bomb that could go, and
I think will go, in a very nasty way. The second one is China. I think China is Lehman squared. China has been trying to solve structural
problems by printing and borrowing. I think this is– they’re not really solving
problems. They’re transforming those problems. And I think this will give into a combination
of problems alongside a gross devaluation of the Chinese yuan. So unfortunately, this is like a room full
of balloons. It’s not quite clear which one will go first. But as one balloon goes, it puts a lot of
pressure into the others. And I think the mechanism by which this happens
is actually through the anti-bubble and implied volatility in particular. So having laid out the beliefs– in my view,
misconceptions– the bubbles, let’s look at what are the anti-bubbles. What are those assets that are grossly artificially
cheap and can help us defend ourselves? And I would say– in the book, I describe
three key anti-bubbles, which I will discuss in more detail. Those are volatility, implied volatility,
financial insurance. Second– it’s implied correlation and the
implications for false diversification. And the third one is gold as the checkmate
of some of these monetary abuses. I think it probably flows better if I discuss
them also in the context of where we are today and setting up some phases into what’s been
happening. So I’d start with phase zero. Phase zero is the last 10 years of monetary
and fiscal abuse whereby we’ve been building the bubbles and the anti-bubble and the complacency
and everything we discussed. Now, this process ended, and it moved us into
phase one, which is driven by the normalization of monetary policy, but most importantly,
the normalization of volatility, starting with implied volatility and then realized
volatility. Now let me go deeper into this, because it’s
hugely relevant, and I think it’s trigger to many things that are happening. So why do I think that implied volatility
has been an anti-bubble? Why has implied volatility been artificially
cheap? Well, it’s the result of a gross imbalance
in the supply and demand of volatility. On the one hand, the demand for volatility
has been quite low. Why would I buy puts on Chinese equities if
Mommy gives me the puts for free, but also in a world where central banks have been telegraphing
monetary policy with dots and this perception of control and low volatility? So demand has been artificially low. But on the other hand, we have artificially
high supply of volatility. And this is arguably the sixth bubble or anti-bubble,
the sixth process that has been part of this desperate search for yield. And this is effectively investors selling
volatility, selling insurance as a way to earn higher yields. This takes many forms. It could be selling covered calls, naked puts
or stops, range accruals, anything that effectively monetizes volatility, sells insurance to create
a higher pick-up. Now, this is– and I personally believe there
is a case of gross mis-selling, because some of these strategies have been labeled as income
strategies. Private banks might be selling these kind
of strategies where you earn– in a negative interest rate world, you’re able to earn 7%
if x and y don’t happen. So let me elaborate into this. If I own a house in Miami, and I rent it,
what I earn is income. So I have an asset, and that is an income
strategy. But if I am selling hurricane insurance on
your house, and his house, and her house, what I’m receiving is insurance premium at
the expense of an insurance liability. The fact that in the last 10 years, there
was no hurricane, and I kept that money in my pocket, doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s
an income strategy. In that sense, when the hurricane hits, things
happen. And people who thought perhaps– and I think
that the move in the VIX in February is, in my view, the equivalent of that Bear Stearns
fund that gated in March 2007 and those early problems that we saw in the Lehman crisis,
the first real wake-up call to, guys, we’ve had artificially low levels of volatility. We are starting this process of normalization. So as, effectively, the market implied volatility
normalizes with that first wake-up call and second that follow through, to me it feels
a little bit like driving a car at 200 miles an hour when the speedometer says 80. Now, if you crash, what do you feel? Well, some people might say nothing because
you’re dead. And I think whoever was short the VIX on that
day probably got taken out or suffered significantly. But the reality is that you feel whatever
the real speed or risk you were taking, regardless of what the speedometer was saying. In the markets, it’s the same. We have value at risk as a proxy for the risk
we’re taking. We have implied and realized volatility as
proxies for the risk we’re taking. But the reality is that the risk you’re taking
is the risk you’re taking, and eventually, time puts you in your place. So effectively, that probably first accident
in February with the VIX was a wake-up call to many people who realized they were going
too fast. And it creates a process where implieds go
up. But what we’ve seen since is also an increase
in realized volatility. You see things moving a lot more, and not
to mention emerging markets, how much they’ve been moving since, but clearly effects or
other markets. And this is again an effect of domino and
snowball. Now, what happens when implied and realized
volatility normalize from artificially low levels to more normal, higher levels, is obviously
my VaR goes up. So my portfolio which used to move 1% a day
perhaps is moving 2%, 3%, which means I’m going to have to cut some risk. And this might lead to a phase two– and this
is the second anti-bible in the system, which is correlations, implied correlations. Effectively, assets– there’s been a perception,
and correlations have been artificially low, whereby your bonds and your equities and your
oil companies and your telecoms or whatever, it looks like they’re different trades. You’re diversified. What’s been happening is– and what happens
in the extreme– is that when there’s a crisis, correlations polarize. And what you see is that as implied volatility
is going up, what you see is risk reduction is exposing the positioning of the market. And what you see is correlations start to
polarize more. So you go from a portfolio that looked like
very low risk because of the low volatility and the low correlation to a portfolio that
starts to have more volatility and where correlations are increasing. This is where I believe we are today. We are already seeing, to a good extent, a
move up, a significant move up in implied and realized volatility. We are now seeing some of those correlations
starting to break, so people somehow scratching their heads because they’re losing money in
their equities and their bonds or many of their assets. And this is something that, because the value
at risk is going up very significantly due to the compounding effect of higher volatility
and polarized correlations, what you see is risk reduction. And that risk reduction is bad news. Because the next high-yield issuance that
comes, perhaps you won’t do the full 100, perhaps you won’t do it at all, or perhaps
you do half of this size, or perhaps you will require a much higher return. So what happens is in a world of zombie companies
and other situations, what we will see is effectively a risk reduction. That leads us to– it’s like a glass that
has been filled, in my view, this will lead to phase three, which is liquidity. The market starts to gap, the problem becomes
bigger, and there is a realization that we are in deeper trouble. Now, that, honestly, could come any minute. It could take days, weeks, months, years. Who knows? Timing is a key consideration. And we’ll talk about that in more detail. But this is a process that is taking steps
in that direction. Now, when that happens– if and when that
happens, then the phase four, which could be quite quick, is we are going to call Mommy
and Daddy again and say, listen, we have a problem. And Mommy and Daddy, being the central banks
and the governments, are, in my view, very likely going to react in the one and only
way they know, which is doing more of the same. We’re going to print more money, and we’re
going to borrow more. There’s going to be another wave of monetary,
another wave of fiscal. Unfortunately, we are, in certain parts of
the world– Europe in particular we’re already in a very asymptotic part of the process whereby
we need to take huge increments moving deeper into negative interest rates or balance sheet
growth to have very small benefits. So this is a very dangerous risk reward whereby–
that’s why I talk– I don’t talk about monetary policy having a limit. We are testing those limits through this asymptotic
process. And this leads to, in my view– when you try
to print and borrow your way out of problems, the degree of freedom is the currency. You could have other paths– inflation, bubbles,
et cetera. But Argentina knows very well, Zimbabwe knows
very well, and Venezuela knows very well that if you try to print and borrow your way out
of problems, eventually what gives in is your currency. So I think at that point in time, this domino
effect continues, currency wars, and its mirror image, which is protectionism and all these
tariffs and stuff. It’s all a check on currency wars. If you devalue by 20%, I’ll put you a tariff
for 20% so I don’t take the hit. They will. And it’s just this global game which, in my
view, leads to this checkmate, which is laid on the currency front where gold is the ultimate
checkmate. And that’s why I identify it as the third
anti-bubble. And this is what we– at Quadriga, we manage
and we invest in assets that are anti-bubble that look effectively to capture that value
but also to protect the portfolio. So the big question here is timing. There are lots of people who have been bearish
for a long time, and effectively fighting what I would call the stupidity of the market. This is a bit like holding your breath, waiting
for something to happen. It’s a very dangerous game. And it can lead to huge draw-downs, huge bleeds
in the portfolios. So what I do, and what we do differently at
Quadriga, is we don’t really fight the stupidity of the market. What we do is we try to embrace the stupidity
of the market. What it means is– one of the things that
the market is doing is giving you virtually almost free insurance, free pay risk. Why? Because of the complacency that nothing is
happening, artificially low volatilities, et cetera. So if you want to buy something like gold,
you could do it and just sit on it. And someone like me who might think, well,
gold is going to be at $2,000 or $3,000 in the medium term, you might think, OK, just
sit on it, and you will make money eventually. The problem is I have a very strong view three
to five years out. I have no idea what’s going to happen in the
next three to five months. And this game is very simple. It’s a game of capital preservation and compounding
on capital preservation. So how do I ensure that I protect my capital
and I remove timing from the equation? So the answer, to me, is buy insurance, especially
if that insurance is artificially cheap. So what you do is you embrace the stupidity
of the market. I might be long the market. I buy my insurance. What it means is if the market goes up, I
enjoy the upside minus insurance premium. But when the market goes down, it’s very powerful. Because as the market gaps or collapses, I
monetize my insurance, and I use that payout to buy more of something that I really like. So effectively, as the market rallies– it’s
a bit like climbing a mountain. When you climb a mountain, what’s your objective? Mine is life preservation. So it’s not a race to the top. You go up. Every few meters, what do you do? Your basically secure your gains. You secure your capital. Yes, I’ve taken a bit of time, a bit of money. And the guy next to me maybe is going faster. But the reality is that when something happens,
I’m left hanging. I’m more protected than he might be. On the way down, effectively, what I do is
I embrace the stupidity of the market, because it’s giving me this very artificially cheap
insurance which allows me to buy even more of something that I like. So at the end of the day, what we’ve been
able to do is to protect the capital and actually enjoy that ride. And what might look like, oh, why are you
being so bullish, why are you wasting money in buying insurance premium– well, first
of all, because it’s artificially cheap. Second, because it’s making me money. It’s allowing me to sleep at night, and it’s
removing time from the equation. So this framework that we use at Quadriga
has been very powerful, because you’re no longer holding your breath. Actually, being in this strategy allows you
to probably make more money– being bullish, I make more money when the market goes down
a lot. Because then I can load up, and when the market
rallies, I have many more ounces. So effectively, the ironic thing is that being
very bullish, I make more money when the market trades lower. But we are embracing that volatility. We are embracing that stupidity of the market. This is a key difference that we– approaches
that we’ve extended to other asset classes. And so we have smart gold. We have smart treasuries. And last week, at the time of writing, we’ve
had a big week in the US equities, down significantly, 4%, 5%. We were up 5.2% on the week. So it shows you that being able to have this
insurance allows you to take advantage of some of these developments in a bubble, anti-bubble
process. So basically, to put everything together,
the concept of understanding that bubbles and antibubbles are driven by beliefs. Sometimes we’re too close to the market. Understanding and challenging these widely
accepted processes whereby the emperor has no clothes in the end. And challenging this is something that we’re
very comfortable with, being a contrarian. So we don’t want to necessarily hold our breath. We want to be in a situation where, when you
build a portfolio, you want to have what I call strikers and midfielders that will do
well in their different scenarios. And in that sense, whoever’s been very short
or very bearish in the last few years, if you’re long a bubble, you need to be careful,
because they can go down. But if you’ve been short that bubble, you
need to be even more, careful because it will take you out. And if you’ve been in cash, you’re short,
because eventually the market drags you in. So in that sense, the ideal portfolio doesn’t
mean sell everything and just go into gold and cash or whatever. I’m not saying that. I’m saying, listen, I don’t have a crystal
ball. I don’t know how long this will take. All I know is that under my beliefs, there
are certain assets that are artificially high. It doesn’t mean that they will collapse tomorrow. But you have to be somehow invested in the
right way in the right assets. There are going to be big differences between
real assets and others. But at the same time, you can’t do that naked. You can’t do that just crossing your fingers. You have to embrace the anti-bubbles. You have to embrace insurance, tailrisk, risk,
gold, and other assets. And that role of the gold keeper, of defender,
is what we are looking to play. So I like to finish by saying that I sincerely
hope I’ll be wrong. This is how I finish the book and how I feel. But I do think that the complacency in the
markets is enormous still today. We are at the beginning of some potentially
truly major developments at a global scale. And I think as Winston Churchill would say,
if we failed to prepare, we should prepare to fail. And I think the asymmetry of probabilities,
the asymmetry of payouts are such that you must embrace the antibubbles and be a little
bit careful with the bubble. So with that, I wish everybody good luck.